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Case No. 20100582-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
JEREMY JAMES DYKES,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from an interlocutory order denying a motion to
dismiss the Information charging him with theft by receiving stolen property, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (West Supp.
2005). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(d)
(West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Following a preliminary hearing, Defendant was bound over to stand
trial for theft by receiving a stolen ATV four-wheeler. The theft was charged as
a second degree felony based, not on value (no such evidence was introduced),
but on the character of the stolen property as an "operable motor vehicle." In
district court, Defendant moved to quash the bindover on the ground that an
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ATV is not an "operable motor vehicle." The district court agreed and ruled
that, because there was no evidence of value, Defendant could only be tried for
class B misdemeanor theft. The court thereafter dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The State then filed a new Information charging
Defendant with third degree felony theft based on the value of the stolen
property. Defendant moved to dismiss the case under State v. Brichey, 714 P.2d
644 (Utah 1986), but the magistrate denied the motion.
Issue. Does state due process, as articulated in State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d
644 (Utah 1986), and its progeny, bar the State from filing a new Information
charging Defendant with theft by receiving stolen property, a third degree
felony, based on the value of the stolen property?
Standard of Review. Whether state due process bars the filing of a
criminal information is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v.
Rogers, 2006 UT 85, \7,151 P.3d 171 (holding that "[t]he interpretation of case
law presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, A N D RULES
The following statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-408 (West Supp. 2005); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (West 2004).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 1
Informations Charging Second Degree Felony Theft by Receiving
On April 7, 2009, Defendant was found driving a stolen ATV fourwheeler on Redwood Road in West Valley City. See 1R116. Three days later,
the State charged Defendant with theft by receiving stolen property, a second
degree felony. 2R115. However, the case was dismissed on June 25, 2009
when the State's key witness failed to appear for the preliminary hearing. See
2R115.
Two weeks later, on July 10, 2009, the State refiled the case against
Defendant. See 1R2-3 (Addendum B). The theft was charged as a second
degree felony under the alternative theories that ''the value of the property was
or exceeded $5,000 or the property stolen was a firearm or an operable motor
vehicle/' 1R2. However, at the preliminary hearing on September 3,2009, the
State proceeded only on the theory that the stolen ATV was an operable motor
vehicle. See 1R116:18 (Addendum C). After taking evidence, the magistrate
bound Defendant over for trial as charged. 1R13-14.
Once in district court, Defendant moved to quash the bindover, arguing
that an ATV is not an operable motor vehicle under section 76-6-412 (West

1

The record on appeal includes the trial record in two district court
cases: Case No. 091905392 FS ("1R"), and Case No. 101901771 FS ("2R").
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2004). 1R18-43. The State countered that even if an ATV is not an "operable
motor vehicle" under the statute, the Court should still bind the case over as a
class A misdemeanor. See 1R48. In support, the State submitted an affidavit
from the ATV's owner as evidence that its value "probably was between $300
and $1,000." lR48,52-53. The district court concluded that an ATV is not an
operable motor vehicle under the statute, refused to consider additional
evidence, and reduced the felony charge to a class B misdemeanor. See 1R54.
On Defendant's motion, the charges were thereafter dismissed in district court
for lack of jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-5-102(8) (2008). 1R66-68.
Information Charging Third Degree Felony Theft by Receiving
On March 9,2010, the State filed a new information charging Defendant
with theft by receiving stolen property. 2R1-2 (Addendum B). This time,
however, the theft was charged as a third degree felony under the theory that
the stolen property "was or exceeded $1,000, but was less than $5,000.,/ 2R1.
Defendant moved to dismiss the Information, arguing that it was filed in
violation of state due process under State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986).
2R21-81. After a hearing, the magistrate denied the motion to dismiss in a
written Ruling and Order. 2R103-06 (Addendum D). This Court granted
Defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State originally charged Defendant with theft by receiving stolen
property, i.e., a stolen ATV four-wheelera second degree felony. At the
preliminary hearing, the State proceeded on the theory that the theft was a
second degree felony based on the character of the stolen property— an ATV
four-wheeler — as an operable motor vehicle. The magistrate bound Defendant
over for trial as charged. In district court, Defendant moved to quash the
bindover on the ground that an ATV is not an operable motor vehicle under
the theft statute. The district court agreed and reduced the theft charge to a
class B misdemeanor. It then dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The
State then filed a new Information in district court, but now alleged a third
degree felony theft by receiving based on the value of the stolen ATV.
The magistrate correctly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss based on
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Because the State charged Defendant
with third degree felony theft based on a different theory — value — than in the
original case —operable motor vehicle —it cannot be said that it wras earlier
dismissed for insufficient evidence and thus Brickey does not apply. Even
assuming arguendo that Brickey applies, the State's failure to produce evidence
of value in the original case was no more than an innocent miscalculation
where (1) the theft by receiving statute does not define motor vehicle, (2) no
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Utah court has addressed the issue, and (3) Defendant did not challenge at the
preliminary hearing the State's claim that an ATV is an operable motor vehicle.
Accordingly, the refiling was justified by good cause.
ARGUMENT
STATE DUE PROCESS DOES NOT BAR THE STATE FROM
CHARGING DEFENDANT WITH THIRD DEGREE FELONY
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY
In denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the March 2010 Information,
the magistrate in this case ruled that the State had "good cause in refiling"
because it "seemingly innocently miscalculated the evidence" in initially
pursuing the theft charge as a second degree felony. See 2R104-05. The
magistrate ruled that "[ojther than [the State's] certain doggedness to refile this
matter, ostensibly to protect the rights of the victim, the facts do not indicate
that the prosecution engaged in abusive practices in refiling the charges."
2R105. The magistrate concluded that the State "has not engaged in forum
shopping, the refiling does not appear to be a tactic to withhold evidence from
the defense, and, based upon the original bindover . . . , the charges are not
groundless or improvident." 2R105. This Court should affirm.
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A. The Brickey rule bars refiling only when potential abusive
practices are involved.
Under article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution," defendants [have]
the right to a preliminary hearing for indictable offenses/' which include
felonies and class A misdemeanors. State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, ^21,29,
Utah Adv. Rep.

. "At the preliminary hearing, the State bears the

burden of presenting sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the
crime has been committed and that the accused has committed it/7 State v.
Pacheco-Ortega, 2011 UT App 186, f 10,257 P.3d 498; accord Utah Const, art. I, §
12 (stating that unless otherwise provided by statute, "the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists"). If the
prosecution meets that burden, the magistrate binds defendant over for trial in
district court. See Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(2). If, on the other hand, the
prosecution fails to meet its probable cause burden, the magistrate must
"dismiss the information and discharge the defendant." Utah R. Crim. P.
7(0(3).
The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to eliminate unwarranted
prosecutions and to "relieve the accused from the substantial degradation and
expense incident to a modern criminal trial when the charges against him are
unwarranted or the evidence insufficient" State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778,784
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(Utah 1980). In short, the preliminary examination "acts as a screening device
to 'ferret o u t . . . groundless and improvident prosecutions/" State v. Brickey,
7U P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986) (quoting Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783-84).
As a general proposition, a dismissal for insufficient evidence does "not
preclude the State from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense." Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i); accord State v. Morgan, 2001UT 87,110,34 P.3d
767 (holding that rule 7 "permits refiling as a general proposition").
Nevertheless, "the State's ability to refile is not without bounds." PacliecoOrtega, 2011 UT App 186, |10. In State v. Brickey, the Utah Supreme Court
recognized that "unbridled prosecutorial discretion to refile charges carries an
inherent potential for abusive practices, repugnant to a defendant's state due
process right to fundamental fairness." 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986). The
Court in Brickey thus held that state "due process considerations prohibit a
prosecutor from refiling criminal charges earlier dismissed for insufficient
evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refiling." Id.
The Supreme Court has since "provided a working list of potentially
abusive practices that bar refiling under the Brickey rule, including 'forum
shopping, repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges for the
purpose to harass,... withholding evidence,... [and] refil[ing] a charge after
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providing no evidence of an essential and clear element of a crime/ " State v.
Rogers, 2006 UT 85, % 11,151 P.3d 171. The Brickey rule "does not, however,
indicate any intent to forbid refiling generally or preclude refiling where a
defendant's due process rights are not implicated/" Morgan, 2001 UT 87, f 15.
As explained in Morgan, "[t]he lodestar of Brickey.... is fundamental fairness."
2001 UT 87, «! 15. "[W]hen potential abusive practices are involved, the
presumption is that due process will bar refiling/7 Id. at ^[16. However,
"[w]hen potential abusive practices are not involved, . . . t h e r e is no
presumptive bar to refiling." Id.2
B. The filing of a new Information charging Defendant with third
degree felony theft did not involve a potential abusive practice.
Under Utah law, a defendant is guilty of theft by receiving stolen
property if he or she: (1) "receives, retains, or disposes of the property of

2

Other jurisdictions have likewise limited any bar to refiling to instances
of bad faith. See, e.g. State v. Elling, 506 P.2d 1102, 1103 (Ariz. App. 1973)
(permitting reprosecution where no forum shopping involved); People v. Sabell,
708 P.2d 463, 466 (Colo. 1985) (permitting refiling where court found no
oppressive tactics); State v. Bacon, 791 P.2d 429,433-34 (Ida. 1990) (permitting
re-prosecution unless there is evidence of bad faith or purposeful harassment);
Stockwell v. State, 573 P.2d 116, 126 (Ida. 1977) (stating "refiling is not
prohibited unless done without good cause or in bad faith"); State v. Vargo, 362
N.W.2d 840, 842-43 (Mich. App. 1985) (holding simple "neglect" rather than
"deliberate attempt to harass defendant" justified refiling); State v. Dail, 4DA
N.W.2d 99, 102 (Neb. 1988) (permitting re-prosecution where no forum
shopping was involved); Chase v. State, 517P.2d 1142,1143 (Okla.Ct.App.1973)
(holding that mistaken testimony in first preliminary hearing justified refiling).
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another/ 7 and (2) "know[s] that [the property] has been stolen, or believ[es]
that it probably has been stolen." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2008). After
taking evidence at the preliminary hearing on the July 2009 Information, the
magistrate found that the evidence was sufficient to establish probable cause of
both theft elements and bound Defendant over to district court for trial on
second degree felony theft as charged. See 1R116:18-19 ("finding probable
cause to bind over" to district court).
On a subsequent motion to quash the bindover, the district court judge
agreed that "the probable cause standard [for theft by receiving] was met
based on the evidence that was provided" at the preliminary hearing.
2R117:15-16.3 However, the court ultimately dismissed the case "without
prejudice" for lack of jurisdiction because it concluded that the State had not
presented sufficient evidence showing that the theft was a second degree
felony.

See 1R117:16; 1R118:5.

At the preliminary hearing, the State

successfully proceeded on the theory that the theft was "a second degree
felony because the [stolen ATV] was an operable motor vehicle." 1R116:18-19;
see 76-6-412(1) (a) (ii) (punishing theft as a second degree felony if the stolen
property is "an operable motor vehicle"). The district court disagreed. It
3

Defendant has not challenged this conclusion on appeal. See Aplt. Brf.
at 14-23.
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concluded that the off-road ATV was not a "motor vehicle" based on the
definition of motor vehicle in section 76-6-410.5, which governs the theft of
rental vehicles:" 'a self-propelled vehicle that is intended primarily for use and
operation on the highways/" See 1R118:16 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-6410.5 (West 2004)).
Following the dismissal of the July 2009 Information, the State refiled the
theft charge against Defendant—this time as a third degree felony based on the
ATV's value. See 2R1-2. On appeal, Defendant argues that this refiling
violated the Brickey rule for two reasons. First, he argues that "the State's
newly proffered evidence [of value] was neither new nor previously
unavailable — that is, it was available at the time of the preliminary hearing and
the State was dilatory in assembling it." Aplt. Brf. at 16-17 (emphasis in
original).

Second, Defendant argues that the State "misinterpreted the

elements of the [theft] offense and failed to produce any evidence on one of
those elements —a practice . . .condemned] as being potentially abusive."
Aplt. Brf. at 17-23. Defendant's claims fail.
As noted, the Brickey rule bars "refiling criminal charges earlier
dismissed for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or
previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies
refiling." Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. A Brickey claim, therefore, involves a two-
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part inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether the subject criminal
charges were "earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence." Id.; Paclieco-Ortega,
2011 UT App 186, f l l (observing that "the Brickey holding was expressly
limited to instances where criminal charges have previously been dismissed for
insufficient evidence"). If so, the Court must then determine whether refiling
is justified based on "new or previously unavailable evidence" or whether
"other good cause justifies refiling." Id.
1. The third degree felony theft by receiving charge was not
earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence of value.
Defendant's claim fails at the outset because the theft by receiving
offense — charged as a third degree felony based on the ATV's value—was not
"earlier dismissed for insufficient evidence" of value. See id.
In pursuing the theft charge as a second degree felony, the State could
proceed on any one of four different theories. Under section 76-6-412, a
defendant is guilty of second degree felony theft if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous w e a p o n . . . at the time of
the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;....
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a) (West 2004). In its July 2009 Information, the
State alleged the first two theories in the alternative — that "the value of the
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property was or exceeded $5,000 or the property stolen was a firearm or an
operable motor vehicle/ 7 1R2. However, at the preliminary hearing, the State
elected not to proceed on a theory based on value, but only on the theory that
•"[i]t's a second degree felony because the [ATV's] an operable motor vehicle/'
1R116:18. As it turned out, the district court concluded that an ATV is not an
operable motor vehicle, reduced the charge to a class B misdemeanor, and
thereafter dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. See 1R117:16-18; 1R1185.
Accordingly, the second degree felony case was not dismissed for insufficient
evidence of value. The State did not proceed on that theory. It relied solely on
the theory that the ATV is an " operable motor vehicle" under section 76-6412(1) (a) (ii). And it was on that basis that the district court reduced the charge
to a misdemeanor.
On appeal, Defendant cites State v. Redd, where the Utah Supreme Court
held that "[a] presumptively abusive practice occurs when a prosecutor refiles
a charge after providing no evidence for an essential and clear element of a
crime at a preliminary hearing." 2001 UT 113, f 20, 37 P.3d 1160. Redd is
inapposite. In Redd, the Supreme Court observed that to convict a person of
disinterment of a dead human body, the State must establish the three "clear
elements" of the offense: (1) "that the dead body was 'buried or otherwise
interred/" (2) "that the defendant disinterred the body," and (3) "that the
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defendant acted intentionally when he or she disinterred the interred dead
body/' Id. at ^}14 (citation omitted). The Court held that because the State
"failed to provide a scintilla of evidence" on the "clear element" of interment,
the Brickey rule barred refiling absent a showing of good cause. Id. at \\7.
Unlike interment under the disinterment statute, the value of stolen
property is not an "essential" element of theft by receiving when charged as a
felony. Whether theft is charged as a second degree felony or third degree
felony may depend on value. See, e.g. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (a) (i)
(second degree felony if value is $5,000 or more); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6412(l)(b)(i) (third degree felony if value is $1,000 or more but less than $5,000).4
For example, theft may be punishable as a second degree felony if the "value of
the property or services is or exceeds $5,000"; or if the "property stolen is a
firearm or an operable motor vehicle"; or if the defendant "is armed with a
dangerous weapon . . . at the time of the theft"; or if the "property is stolen
from the person of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(a). Theft may be
punishable as a third degree felony if the "value of the property or services is
or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000"; or if the defendant "has been twice
4

Section 76-6-412 was amended in 2010 and now provides that third
degree felony theft requires a value of $1,500 or more but less than $5,000. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b)(i) (West Supp. 2010). Misdemeanor theft is
dependent on value. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(c) (West Supp. 2010).
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before convicted of theft, any robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit
theft"; or if the property taken is one of an enumerated list of animals. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (b).
In charging second degree felony theft, the State may pursue any of the
four available theories, and its decision to pursue a particular theory over the
others does not preclude it from later pursuing, an alternative theory. This is
particularly true where, as here, the State has already established at the
previous preliminary hearing the essential elements of the crime of theft by
receiving. Cf Pacheco-Ortega, 2011 UT App 186, ^11 (holding that the Brickey
bar to refiling is "expressly limited to instances where criminal charges have
previously been dismissed for insufficient evidence").
2. Even assuming, arguendo, that the third degree felony theft
by receiving charge was earlier dismissed for insufficient
evidence of value, "other good cause" justified refiling.
Even if this Court were to assume, for argument's sake, that the third
degree felony theft by receiving charge was earlier dismissed for insufficient
evidence of value, the district court correctly ruled that good cause justified
refiling.
As explained, criminal charges earlier dismissed may be refiled if "the
prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced
or that otlter good cause justifies refiling." Briclcey, 714 P.2d at 647 (emphasis
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added). Brickey's "other good cause" provision "represents a broad category
with 'new or previously unavailable evidence' as but two examples of
subcategories that come within its definition." Morgan, 2001 UT 87, \I9.

In

other words," '[o]ther good c a u s e ' . . . simply means additional subcategories,
other than 'new evidence' or 'previously unavailable evidence/ that justify
refiling." Id.
In Morgan, the Utah Supreme Court recognized a prosecutor's "innocent
miscalculation" of the evidence necessary for bindover as an additional
subcategory of good cause. Id. In doing so, the Court "emphasize[d] that the
miscalculation must be innocent, and further investigation must be nondilatory
and not otherwise infringe on due process rights of a defendant."

Id.

(emphasis in original). The magistrate in this case correctly relied on the
"innocent miscalculation" subcategory of good cause in concluding that the
State was not barred from filing the new information charging Defendant with
third degree felony theft by receiving. See 2R103-06.
As discussed, the prosecutor originally pursued the theft charge as a
second degree felony based on the nature of the stolen property as an operable
motor vehicle, not on the value of the stolen property. See 1R116:18. Although
the prosecutor was successful in obtaining bindover from the magistrate, the
district court later concluded that an off-road ATV was not a "motor vehicle"
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for purposes of section 76-6-412. 1R117:16. Contrary to Defendant's claim on
appeal, the magistrate in this case correctly concluded that the prosecutor
innocently miscalculated the evidence necessary for a second degree felony
bindover.
Section 76-6-412 makes it a second degree felony to knowingly receive a
stolen,"operable motor vehicle/ 7 but does not define that term. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-412. In moving to quash the bindover, 1R22-24, Defendant
argued—for the first time —that ''motor vehicle" as used in section 76-6412(1) (a)(ii), should be given the same meaning it is given in section 76-6-410.5,
to wit,."a self-propelled vehicle that is intended primarily for use and
operation on the highways/' Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-410.5 (West 2004). The
district court accepted this argument and, because no evidence of value was
introduced at the preliminary hearing, reduced the charge to a class B
misdemeanor. See 1R117:16-18. Notwithstanding the district court's ruling, it
is far from clear that the Legislature intended that the term "motor vehicle" in
section 76-6-412 have the same meaning that it is given in section 76-6-410.5.
Indeed, this issue has never been decided by either this Court or the Utah
Supreme Court.
The district court may have decided the issue correctly. As noted by that
court, section 76-6-412 is in the same part of the Criminal Code as section 76-6-
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410.5. See 1R117:16. Sometimes, this suggests that the terms should share the
same meaning. But a review of Title 76, chapter 6, part 4 suggests otherwise.
Part 4 includes a list of definitions for terms used in that part generally, but
"motor vehicle" is not among them. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (West
2004). That term is only defined under section 76-6-410.5, which defines the
offense of theft of a rental vehicle. This would suggest that the definition used
therein is specific to rental vehicle thefts. Otherwise, the definition would have
been, found in the list of definitions for part 4 generally. It would seem,
therefore, that "motor vehicle" should be given its broader, ordinary meaning,
i.e., a vehicle with a motor. See Envirocare of Utah v. Utah State Tax Common,
2009 UT 1, \5, 201 P.3d 982 (holding that "[w]hen a term is not defined by
statute, we look to its common usage to define it").5
Indeed, at the time of the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor proceeded
on the theory that an off-road ATV is a motor vehicle under section 76-6-412.

5

Moreover, the State's review of the Utah Criminal Code reveals that
only section 76-6-410.5 limits the definition of "motor vehicle" to self-propelled
vehicles that are primarily for use on the highways. Seef e.g., Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-207(1)(b) (West Supp. 2009) (defining motor vehicle as a "self-propelled
vehicle"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207.5(1)(b) (West Supp. 2009) (same); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-2202(1)(c) (West Supp. 2011) (same). As noted by
Defendant in his motion to quash the bindover, in other provisions throughout
the Code, "motor vehicle" is alternatively defined as either a self-propelled
vehicle or a self-propelled vehicle primarily for use on the highways. See 1R23.
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See 1R116:18.

Counsel for Defendant did not argue otherwise and the

magistrate agreed to bind the matter over as charged based on that theory. See
1R116:17-19. Defendant did not claim that an off-road ATV is not a motor
vehicle under section 76-6-412 until after the bindover in district court See
1R22-24. Had Defendant raised the issue at the preliminary hearing, rather
than in a motion to quash in district court, the State could have sought a short
continuance to secure evidence establishing this alternative theory. See Rogers,
2006 UT 85, f 21 (holding that "it would be reasonable to grant a continuance
when the prosecution, in good faith, fails to present sufficient evidence but the
necessary evidence is reasonably available"). Defendant's failure to raise this
challenge at a time when the prosecution could have responded also
constitutes good cause justifying the filing of the new information.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted November 21, 2011.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

3Y S.GRAY

d i s t a n t Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (West Supp. 2005)
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of
the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing
that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or
aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the property from the
owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the
owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is
presumed in the case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen
on a separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year
preceding the receiving offense charged; or
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or
personal property, or an agent, employee, or representative of a
pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains property
and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the
property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at
the bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one positive form of identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or
personal property, and every agent, employee, or representative of a
pawnbroker or person who fails to comply with the requirements of
Subsection (2) (c) is presumed to have bought, received, or obtained
the property knowing it to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained.
This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the
evidence that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has
or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand
merchandise or personal property, or was an agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person, that the defendant
bought, received, concealed, or withheld the property without
A-l
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obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then the
burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property
bought, received, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(c), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal
processors as defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) " Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or
selling goods.
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who:
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, or deals
in the purchase, exchange, or possession of personal property
on condition of selling the same property back again to the
pledge or depositor;
(ii) loans or advances money on personal property by
taking chattel mortgage security on the property and takes or
receives the personal property into his possession and who
sells the unredeemed pledges; or
(iii) receives personal property in exchange for money or
in trade for other personal property.
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or
lending on the security of the property.

A-2
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Utah Code Ann. 76-6-412 (West 2004)
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter
shall be punishable:
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the:
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000;
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor
vehicle;
(iii) actor is armed with a dangerous weapon, as defined
in Section 76-1-601, at the time of the theft; or
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another;
(b) as a felony of the third degree if:
(i) the value of the property or services is or exceeds
$1,000 but is less than $5,000;
(ii) the actor has been twice before convicted of theft,
any robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit theft; or
(iii) in a case not amounting to a second-degree felony,
the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cowf
heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny,
swine, poultry, or a fur-bearing animal raised for commercial
purposes;
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property
stolen is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property
stolen is less than $300.
(2) Any person who violates Subsection 76-6-408(1) or Section 766-413, or commits theft of property described in Subsection 76-6412(1)(b) (iii), is civilly liable for three times the amount of actual
damages, if any sustained by the plaintiff, and for costs of suit and
reasonable attorneys1 fees.
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ADDENDUM B
Informations
(dated July 10, 2009 and March 9,2010)
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LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CLIFFORD ROSS, Bar No. 2802
Deputy District Attorney
111 E. BROADWAY, SUITE #400
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

• W L f . 0 2QQ9
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

JEREMY JAMES DYKES
DOB: 12/30/1979,
4172 West Paynter Cove
WVC,UT 84128
OTN
SO# 0317266
Defendant.

Screened by: CLIFFORD ROSS
Assigned to: CLIFFORD ROSS (Tuesday)
DAO# 09023068
Bail: $10,000
[Warrant/Release: Non-Jail
INFORMATION
ICaseNo.

The undersigned C. Lance - West Valley Police Department, Agency Case No.
09101.4357, upon a written affidavit states on information and belief that the defendant, JEREMY
JAMES DYKES, committed the crime of:
COUNT 1
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, (345)76-6-408 UCA, second degree felony,
as follows: That on or about April 07, 2009 at 3725 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah the defendant received, retained or disposed of property of another, knowing that
the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, or concealed, sold or
withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property, knowing the property had
been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and the value of the property was or
exceeded S5,000 or the property stolen was a firearm or an operable motor vehicle.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Danny Robb, Karen Robb, P. Plese, C. Lance, Dusty Ha, Wes Dudley, Mark Dell,
Terrence Chen
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INFORMATION
DAONo. 09023068
Page 2

AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE:
Your affiant bases this Information upon the following:
The statement of Karen Robb, to Nephi City Police Officer W. Dudley, that she lives at
689 South 200 East, Nephi, Juab County, Utah. At approximately 7:00 p.m., on January 7, 2009,
Ms. Robb's trailer with two 4-wheelers on it was parked in front of her home. When Ms. Robb
checked the next morning, she found that the trailer and both 4-wheelers were missing. Ms.
Robb further stated that one of the 4-wheelers, a 2004 Honda, belonged to her brother-in-law,
Danny Robb.
The written report of West Valley City Police Officer P. Plese that on April 7, 2009, he
observed a 4-wheeler being driven in traffic at 3725 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County,
Utah. Officer Plese had the driver, defendant Jeremy James Dykes, pull over. A records check
revealed that the 4-wheeler was the one stolen from Danny Robb.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 46-5-101
(2007) I declare under criminal penalty of the State
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the
best of my belief and knowledge.
Executed-o'm)

Affiant

,^\L^^^P
(1

Z&

S(-<?* PA^

ZtfOf

Cff/^iZL

Authorized for presentment and filing
/?
LOHRA^t/MILLER, District Attorney

lieputy District AtferfTey
26th day of June, 2009
GAM / DAO # 09023068
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FILED BISTIIIC? COURT
LOHRA L. MILLER. 6420
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
CLIFFORD ROSS, Bar No. 2802
Deputy District Attorney
111 E. BROADWAY, SUITE #400
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)363-7900

Third Judicial District

MAR 0 9 2010
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By

,

WV
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Screened by: CLIFFORD ROSS
Assigned to: CLIFFORD ROSS (Tuesday)

Plaintiff,
DAO# 10007190
-vsJEREMY JAMES DYKES
DOB 12/30/1979,
AKANONE
4172 West Paynter Cove
WVC, UT 84128
D.L.# 159733669
OTN
SO# 0317266
Defendant.
*

SUMMONS TO BE ISSUED
Warrant/Release: Non-Jail

INFORMATION

Case No.

101901111

The undersigned C. Lance - West Valley Police Department, Agency Case No.
091014357, upon a written affidavit states on information and belief that the defendant, JEREMY
JAMES DYKES, committed the crime of:
COUNT 1
THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, (348) 76-6-408 UCA, third degree felony, as
follows: That on or about April 07, 2009 at 3725 South Redwood Road, in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah the defendant received, retained or disposed of property of another, knowing that
the property had been stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen, or concealed, sold or
withheld or aided in concealing, selling or withholding the property, knowing the property had
been stolen, intending to deprive the owner thereof, and the value of said property was or
exceeded $1,000, but was less than $5,000 or the defendant had been twice before convicted of
theft, robbery, or any burglary with intent to commit theft.
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Terrence Chen, Mark Dell, Wes Dudley, Dusty Ha, C. Lance, P. Plese, Karen Robb,
Danny Robb
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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INFORMATION
DAONo. 10007190
Page 2 .

AFFIDAVIT OF PROBABLE CAUSE:
Your affiant bases this Information upon the following:
The statement of Karen Robb, to Nephi City Police Officer W. Dudley, that she lives at
689 South 200 East, Nephi, Juab County, Utah. At approximately 7:00 p.m., on January 7, 2009,
Ms. Robb's trailer with two 4-wheelers on it was parked in front of her home. When Ms. Robb
checked the next morning, she found that the trailer and both 4-wheelers were missing. Ms.
Dudley further stated that one of the 4-wheelers, a 2004 Honda, belonged to her brother-in-law,
Danny Robb.
The written report of West Valley City Police Officer P. Plese that on April 7, 2009, he
observed a 4-wheeler being driven in traffic at 3725 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County,
Utah. Officer Plese had the driver, defendant Jeremy James Dykes, pull over. A records check
revealed that the 4-wheeler was the one stolen from Danny Robb.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 46-5-101
(2007) I declare under criminal penalty of the State
of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct to the
best of my belief and knowledge.
Executed on:

2)Q)>a

•-C LANCE
Affiant
Authorized for presentment and filing
LOHRAl/ MILLER, District Attorney

Dfeput^ DisWfAttorney
3rd day of March, 2010
GAM/DAO# 10007190
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ADDENDUM C
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing
(September 3,2009)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Case No. 091905392 FS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Appellate Case No. 20100582

vs.
JEREMY JAMES DYKES,
Defendant.

PRELIMINARY HEARING SEPTEMBER 3,2009
BEFORE
JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER

RLED
UTAH APPELLATE COURT^

CAROLYNERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT T R A N S C R I B E
1775 East Ellen Way
"
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

w m | C T

m

SALT LAKE COUNTY A A \f\

H i Bail Rf
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APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

CLIFFORD C. ROSS, IH
Assistant District Attorney

For the Defendant:

ELIZABETH A. LORENZO
Attorney at Law
* * *

INDEX
WITNESS
PATRICK PLESE
Direct Examination by Mr. Ross
Cross Examination by Ms. Lorenzo
Redirect Examination by Mr. Ross
Re-Cross Examination by Ms. Lorenzo
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
Ms. Lorenzo
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15
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 3, 2009
JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification
may not be accurate with audio recordings.)
P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:
MR. ROSS:

You ready to go?
We are.

THE COURT:
Jeremy James Dykes.
see you.

Cliff Ross for the State.

This is in the matter of State v.
Is he in custody?

I'm sorry, I couldn't

I'm used to looking another direction in my

courtroom.

Okay.

This is case number 091905392. Mr.

Clifford Ross for the state, Ms. Elizabeth Lorenzo for the •
defendant.
Do you waive reading today, counsel?
MS. LORENZO:
THE COURT:

Yes, Judge.
Thank you.

Go ahead and call your

witness.
MR. ROSS:

Officer Plese, ask him to step forward.

MS. LORENZO:

I'm sorry, just quickly before the

record, before he takes the stand, we do have potentially one
witness that we might call at trial, so I asked her to step
outside the courtroom.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

///
///
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PATRICK PLESE
Having first been duly'sworn, testified
upon his oath as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. ROSS:
Q

Good morning.

A

Good morning.

Q

State your name and employment please?

A

Patrick Plese.

I work for West Valley Police

Department.
Q,

And spell your last name.

A .

It's P-L-E-S-E."

Q

And how long have you worked there?

A

For West Valley since 1997.

Q

And what are your duties in that work?

A

Right now I'm a traffic enforcement officer on

.

motor division.
Q

Okay.

Drawing your attention to April 7,'2009,

or near 3725 South Redwood Road, were you on duty in that
location?
.A

Yes, I was.

Q

And that location is within Salt Lake County?

A

Yes, it is.

Q

What occurred?

A

I was monitoring traffic mainly north and
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southbound on Redwood Road.

I observed a four-wheeler coming

through the intersection at 3800 South and Redwood.

Four-

wheeler was traveling actually eastbound from 38th South and
turned northbound onto Redwood Road.
Q

Okay.

And what did you notice about the vehicle or

the manner in which it was being operated?
A

Well, it was an off-road vehicle and it turned

northbound onto Redwood Road and turned into number three
travel lane and proceeded northbound on Redwood Road.
Q

Okay.

Did it have plates or registration for being

operated on the highways?
A

Once I stopped it, no.

I've never seen one.

type of four-wheeler can't be registered.

That

There's no way to

make it road legal in Utah.
Q

Okay.

So you determined that to be some type of

violation?
A

Yes, it was.

Q

Okay.

vehicle?

And you - did you observe the speed of the.

Was there anything unusual about that or the

mannerA

No.

Q

- of it's operation?

A ; No, just the manner of the vehicle, it can't go on
the road.
Q

Okay.

So you pulled it over?
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1

A

Yes, I did.

2

Q

And how many people were on it?

3

A

One.

4

Q

And do you recognize that person in court today?

5•

A

I do.

6

Q

Point him out please.

A

He's sitting at the table there.

Q

What's, he wearing for the record?

A

A plaid shirt, glasses, levis.

7
8

•
.

9
10
11

MR. ROSS:
•

THE COURT:

12
•13
14
15

MR. ROSS:
Q

May the record reflect The record will reflect identification.
Thank you.

(BY MR. ROSS)

'. -'

Go on and describe what you observed

and what occurred.
A

I was on my motorcycle, I got off my motorcycle and

16

just walked down into the number three travel lane.

As the

17

four-wheeler got closer and I just pointed to pull into the

18

driveway where I was sitting, which it did.

19

Q

Okay.

20

A.

As it pulled into the driveway I noticed it had -

21

it had several different colors of paint, and some of the

22

paint was peeling off.

You could see the factory yellow that

23 I Honda has on a lot of their motorcycle and four-wheelers was
24
25

still showing on part of the four-wheeler..
Q

Okay.

And what was the four-wheeler if you could
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describe it in more detail?

1

' A

It was a Honda.

to be a few years old.
Okay.

Q

It was a brand name?
It wasn't brand new.

It appeared

Appeared to be in decent condition.

So did you have any discussion with the..

driver at that point?

A

Yes, I did.'

Q

What did he say?

A

Well, the first thing I did was get identification

from him

What did you say?

I believe he provided a Utah driver's license with

his name and a date of birth on it. •

Q

And that would be Jeremy James Dykes?

A

Yes, date of birth 12/30/79.

Q

Okay.

Did you have any discussion with him about

how he came to be riding that particular vehicle?
Oh yeah, I asked him if it was his four-wheeler and

A

he told me it was.
Q .

Okay.

And did you investigate to determine who the

record owner was?
Yes, I did.'
•

1
yes.

A

Q

What did you do and what did you determine?

A

I asked him if it was his four-wheeler, he said

I asked him if it was registered to him, and he said

no.

Q

Okay.

A

So I asked him who it was registered to and I asked
• . .
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5

him to find the registration on the vehicle for me.

He did

find the registration and he did give it to me.
Q
A

Okay.
• I looked at the registration.

He told me that the

vehicle he had bought from the registered owner Gary Smith.
The registration showed that it was registered to a Myrna
Robb.
Q

Okay.

And how did you go about determining the

registered owner?
A

Well, I checked the VIN number on the registration

against the VIN number on the. four-wheeler and it matched.
Q

Okay.

I've - I've given you - did he - did the

defendant say anything else in addition to that concerning
how he came to be in possession of that ATV?
A
• Q

No.
All right.

I've shown you before you took the

stand a witness statement signed by a Danny Robb?
A

Yes.

Q

And have you read through that and determined the

VIN number and the description of the 2004 Honda factory
yellow rancher model ATV was - was accurate and that this
statement refers to that ATV?
A

Yes.
MR. ROSS:

Okay.

Your Honor, I'd offer this under

Rule 1102, statement of the owner.
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THE COURT:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Any objection,

Ms. Lorenzo?
I just object to the changing, I

MS. LORENZO:

mean, things are written out or that's, you know, crossed off

and then [inaudible].
The interlineations we like to say to

THE COURT:
be pompous. That one?
MS. LORENZO:
'THE COURT:

MR. ROSS:

Yes.
Okay.

The crossed out things were initialed,

Your Honor.
I see they're initiale d and I'm going

THE COURT:

to receive it for purposes of this hearing only.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit ? received)

MR. ROSS:

All right.

(BY MR. ROSS)

Q

you and the defendant?

What else transacted there between
What else did he say ?

What else did

you do be fore you left the scene?

A

Well, I had dispatch check the VIN number for

! stolen.

Q

And what did you learn?

A

Dispatch told me it was listed as a stolen vehicle

out of Nephi.
All right.

Q

Did you take the defendant into

cus tody?

7
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A

Yes, I did.

Q

All right.

Did you, from reading the or from the

statements from other officers involved in the case, did you
get any information about what occurred in Nephi?
A

A little bit, yes.

Q

Okay. And this is from other officers in Nephi

reporting or giving you that information?
A
Q

. Yes.
What did you learn as far as the vehicle in

question was concerned and what occurred to it in Nephi?
.A - I spoke on the phone to the officer from Nephi. He
told me that two four-wheelers and a trailer had been stolen.
And he told me he was on his way to Salt Lake County to try
and interview the person that I had placed in custody.
Q

All right.
Your Honor, I'd also offer at this time another

Rule 1102 statement from Karen Robb who's the owner of the
trailer and the other ATV, which together with the subject
ATV were taken without her consent.- were stolen basically
from her home in Nephi.

I've given counsel a copy.

MS. LORENZO: And, Your Honor, I just object to the
stuff that's not relevant.

He's not charged with anything

with regards to those.
THE COURT: What is the relevance, counsel?
MR. ROSS:

That he knew the property was stolen.
. 8
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THE COURT:. It appears he showed knowledge and
intent/ I guess.

I'll receive it -

MR. ROSS: I'll submit it.
THE COURT: - for purposes of this hearing only.
Cross-examine.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit ? received)
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MS. LORENZO:
Q

The other ATV, not the one from Mr. Robb, but the

other one - the other I think one plus a trailer, he wasn't
found in possession of; is that correct?
A . That's correct.
Q

^

He was just with the one VIN number that you've

seen referenced in the Danny Robb 1102?
A

Yes.

Q

And did you have someone go out and check his

residence for those other ATVs?
A
Q

I did.
. You did.

A

No.

Q

Okay.

And were they there?

So going back to your initial encounter with

him, would you say it was unusual to see an ATV on the road?
A

Very unusual.

Q

And clearly caught your attention?

A

Yes.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1 I

Q

And that's why you initiated a traffic stop?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

And when you did that, you I think you actually say

4

you just pointed to the driver to pull over?

5

A

6

.

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Yes, ma'am.

Q . And he followed your direction?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

And he pulled over into a driveway before you even

9

parked?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

And is it fair to say he was cooperative with you?

A

Yes.

12•

'

13

•Q

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

He assisted you in trying to find a registration?

16

•A

17
18

He provided you with his driver's license?

Yes.

Q.

.

He - of which he actually didn't know where it was,

the registration; is that fair to say?

19

A

Yes, it took him a minute to find it.

20

Q

And he had to go through some type of paperwork or

21

not in the - he had to go get it out of a different

22 I compartment or something; is that correct?
23

A

Yes, that's correct.

24

Q '

And I think you say it took him several minutes to

25

find the registration.
10
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A

Yes.

Q

But when you asked him initially he said that he

bought it from, Gary Smith,
A

Yes.

Q

And that it was his ATV.

A

Yes.

Q

Did you ever ask him if he'd seen the registration

before?
A

No.

Q

So you don't know if he'd ever seen that it was

registered to someone different?
A

I have no idea.

Q

And you would agree with me that in order to be

guilty of this he has to either know that this was stolen or
believe that it probably had been stolen?
MR. ROSS:

A legal opinion.

THE COURT:

Objection.

The officer did make some

'

determinations based on his training and experience, to the
extent you wish to offer that opinion.
THE WITNESS:

Yes, sir, as far as I understand the

statute, you would need to know that it's a stolen vehicle.
Q

(BY MS. LORENZO)

And so, I mean, you arrested him

for this?
A

Yes.

Q

What led you'to believe that he knew it was a
11
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1

stolen vehicle?

2

.

3

any vehicle or drive any vehicle that I don't know where it

4

came from or who owns it.

5
6
7
8
9
10

A

Q
him?

Okay.

I don't get on

But not speaking for yourself, what about

What led you to believe that he knew it was stolen?
A .

Well, he's an adult with a driver's license and

he's driving the vehicle.
Q

Okay.

So the fact that he was in possession of it

was the only reason you thought he knew?

11

A

12

Q

13

Well, I - I can speak for myself.

Sure.
. Because you didn't - you didn't ask him about the

registration of seeing it before?

14 J

A

No.'

15

Q

Whether or not he'd seen it?

16

A

No.

17 I

Q

Did you ask him if he knew the Myrna Robb?

18

A; . No.

19

Q

And so what you also indicated the fact that he was

20 I in possession, that was - that would be why you think he
21
22

probably ought to have known it was stolen?
A

. Well, that's one - one small part.

I can give you

23.

the - probably several different why I believe it was stolen

24

right from the beginning.

25 I

Q

Not why you believe but what he believed it was
12
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stolen.
THE COURT:

What he believed that he should have

known?
MS- LORENZO:

Right.

THE WITNESS:

The way you're asking the question,

all I can tell you is I would believe, not only as a police
officer but as a person that drives any vehicle on the
streets anywhere like most people -

Q

(BY MS. LORENZO)

Okay.

A

- there's things that would lead me to believe that

the veh icle is either should be on the road or shouldn't.

Q

Okay.

But what about with regards to Mr. Dykes?

A

I can't tell you what he thinks.

Q

So you don't know of any, I mean, you have no

reason to think that he personally knew that it was stolen?
Yes, I do.

A

i

What?
•

"

'

Q

.A

The paint that was on that vehicle any reasonable

person could have looked at that and realized that there's no
reason to basically ruin the paint of a very nice vehicle the
way it had been ruined.

Q.

But you have no idea if he put that paint on or how

: that paint go there?

A

I have no idea.

Q

Other than the paint, any other reason other than

13
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1

the paint?

2

A

3
4
5
6

I'm sorry, you're going to have to clarify that.

I'm not exactly sure Q

You said there were several reasons.

I'm wondering

if there's any other reason other than the paint?
A

Yes.

I have yet in my entire career to find an

7

adult riding a vehicle like that that should be off-road on a

8

seven-lane highway through the middle of the city.

9

very, very abnormal.

10

Q

11

that, right?

12 J

A

13

Q

It's

I mean someone who is likely to get caught by doing
*

• I would think so.
Someone who is out in the open doing that is not

14

thinking that I'm going to get, I mean, knowing that they're

15

probably going to get pulled over by the police?

16

A

If I was - I . can answer this way.

If I was riding

17

that vehicle down Redwood Road, especially that time of day,

18

I would expect to encounter a police officer.

19
20

. .Q .

And he wasn't trying to hide himself or his .

identity or himself on that vehicle?

21

A

I don't think so.

22

Q

Did you do any investigation as to Gary Smith?

23

A

No.

24

Q

So you - you didn't go to look and see if Gary

25

Smith existed?
14
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A

Gary Smith, sure, I read him Miranda.

talk to him, he wouldn't talk to me.

I want to

I can't do anything

with the name Gary Smith.
Q

Okay.

But, okay, so you didn/t investigate whether

or not a Gary Smith, in fact, existed?
A

No.

I'm sure there's a Gary Smith in Utah, but

there's a phone book full of them. •
MS. LORENZO: May I have just one moment, Judge?
THE COURT:

You may.

MS. LORENZO:

I don't think I have anything further

at this time.
THE COURT:
MR. ROSS:

Any re-direct on this one?
Briefly.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. ROSS:
Q

Did the defendant produce a certificate of title

showing he owned the vehicle?
A

No.

Q

And whose name was the registration, do you know?

A

Yeah, it was the Myrna Robb.

Q

Okay.

A

No.

Q

Okay.

Not Gary Smith?

Do you have any information from any record

of any type connecting a Gary Smith to this vehicle?
A

No.
15
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1
2

Q

You have this 1102 from the owner that said they

owned it, they didn't give permission, don't you?

3

A

Correct.

4

MR. ROSS:

5
6

BY MS. LORENZO:
Q

Did you look for a Gary Smith that owned this

vehicle?

9

A

No, ma'am.

10

MS. LORENZO:

11

THE COURT:

12

We'll submit it.

RE-CROSS EXAMINATION '

7
8

Nothing further.

All right.- Nothing further.
Thank you, officer.

You may step down,

sir.

13

Any more witnesses for the State?

14

MR. ROSS:

The State rests on the evidence.

15

.

THE COURT:

Defense?

16

.

17

there's been sufficient evidence for a probable cause -

18

determination that my client either knew or probably should

19

have known that this was stolen.

20

bought it from a Gary Smith.

21

registered in his name.

22

never looked at the registration before.

-MS. LORENZO:

Yes, Judge, I don't think that

He told the officer that he

He knew that it wasn't

He had, I mean, he knew that he had
I would think a

23 I paint job is sufficient to say that that's - we don't even
24

know if he did the paint job or where that paint job came

25

from, to say that someone probably ought to have known it's
16
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stolen.

I think that's the really only basis THE COURT:

You don't think the paint job that /

maybe the officer's really saying something like the broken
steering column, someone had punched out?

One of those

things [inaudible], this doesn't make sense?
MS. LORENZO:

I think that -

THE COURT: Under the very lowest probable cause
standard, but MS. LORENZO:

Right.

I mean, and he might be able

to do that, but I don't think that that's sufficient.

I

mean, a paint job in and of itself coming is not probable
cause that someone should have known it was stolen. And
that's the point I just think that could have come from him
or any other, you know, from when it was purchased by my
client.
THE COURT:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

MS. LORENZO: Additionally, I don't think there's
been any evidence of value that's been submitted in this
charge that's something to exceed $5,000.
think it should be bound over.
THE COURT:

And so I don't

For those two reasons that -

You don't think it should be bound over

or not at that level.

It certainly could be bound over at

that level or - or [inaudible]?
• MS. LORENZO:

That's correct, Judge, because I

don't think there's been probable cause that he knew or
17
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1

probably should have known that it was stolen, and then I

2

don't think there's been any evidence submitted of. value.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. ROSS:

. 5

Mr. Ross?
It's a second degree felony because the

items an operable motor vehicle.

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. LORENZO:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. ROSS:

10
11
12

Value is an alternative.

Not value based, an alternative?
That's not how it's charged.

Let's have a look.
Well, theft by receiving on or about

April 7 THE COURT:

Well, the property stolen was a firearm

or an operable vehicle.

That's what the information says.

13

MR. ROSS:

14 I

MS. LORENZO: I don't have that.

15

THE COURT:

16

A n d the

I don't think it's an amendment, but

that's the information.

17

MS. LORENZO:

18

MR. ROSS:

19
20

• - • • ' .

Okay.

Yes, Your Honor.

I'll submit it.

I think the court has

it in hand.
THE COURT:

I think with that issue and that was

21

interesting one on the value [inaudible] but you're

22

absolutely right, there was no evidence.

23

operable motor vehicle as the officer said he couldn't

24

operated it where it was, but it was operating, but I think

25

the officer, actually I think that there's a number of

But with the

18.
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factors but the paint alone, I mean, this is something in the
officer's experience or their basis to say now, why does that
makes sense?

It's certainly enough for the low cause - low

level of proof requirement to bind over on a preliminary
hearing, so I am finding probable cause to bind over setting
it before Judge Christiansen for further proceedings.
COURT CLERK:

September 25th, 9:00 a.m., Judge

Christiansen.
THE COURT:
MR. ROSS;
. THE COURT:
MR. ROSS:
THE COURT:

Do you wish to withdraw the 1102fs?
May I?

Thank you.

Thank you.
May I excuse the officer?
You may.

And thank you, Officer.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

-c-

19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing transcript in
the before mentioned proceeding held Judge Robert
Hilder. was transcribed by me from an audio recording
and is a full, true and correct transcription of the
requested proceedings as set forth in the preceding pages to
the best of my ability.
Signed November 8, 2010 in Sandy, Utah.

Carolyn .i/riclcson
Certified Shorthand Reporter
Certified Court Transcriber

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•1
ADDENDUM D
Ruling and Order [on Brickey motion]
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' " " a Judicial Dfet'rtoV'

JUL 0 l 2010
SALT LAKE COUNT

:

:

;

;

in

;

<f

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

•

•

.

STATE OF UTAH,
RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 101901771

JEREMY JAMES DYKES,
Defendant.

Judge Michele M. Christiansen
Date: July 1,2010

The above matter came before the court for decision on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
submitted June 22, 2010 on the grounds that it was re-filed in violation of the State v. Brickey,
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). Being fully advised, the court makes the following ruling:
The Court finds that because the prosecutor innocently miscalculated the quantum of
evidence and the defense is unable to show that the prosecution engaged in abusive practices in
miscalculating the evidence, dismissal pursuant to State v. Brickey is inappropriate because no
presumptive bar to refiling exists.
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(3) allows a magistrate to dismiss and discharge a defendant if the
State's evidence fails to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the
charged crime, but Rule 7 also allows the State to refile as "dismissal and discharge do not
preclude the State from instituting subsequent prosecution for the same offense." However, state
due process protections prohibit a "prosecutor from refilling criminal charges earlier dismissed
for insufficient evidence unless the prosecutor can show that new or previously unavailable
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evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies refilling." State v. Brickey 714 P.2d 644,
647 (Utah 1986).
The primary purposes underlying the Brickey rule is to preclude a prosecutor from
seeking an unfair advantage over a defendant through forum shopping by harassing a defendant
through repeated filings of groundless and improvident charges, or from withholding evidence.
State v. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, \ 15, 34 P.3d 767 (emphasis added).
The Brickey analysis indicates that "new or previously unavailable evidence" and "good
cause" represent two broad categories that allow for refilling and "other good cause." The Utah
Supreme Court has held that "good cause" may exist "when a prosecutor innocently
miscalculates the quantum of evidence" required to obtain a bind over. Morgan, 2001 UT 87, %
14. And while the Utah Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor's innocent miscalculation of
the necessary quantum of evidence is sufficient grounds to refile, due process violations are not
necessarily implicated when charges are refilled as long as the miscalculation is innocent and
further investigation does not violate due process rights of the defendant. Id. at ^f 19.
The State first filed charges against the defendant in April 2009, but the case wras
dismissed without prejudice because the State's witnesses were not present. At the September 3,
2009, preliminary hearing, the second time the State filed charges against the defendant, the
Judge found probable cause to bind the matter over as charged as a Second Degree Felony. After
the Court denied the State's request to re-open the Preliminary Hearing and bound the case over
as a class B misdemeanor, the State filed the current matter a third time as a Third Degree
Felony. And while the defense has not received new or previously unavailable evidence, Brickey
allows for refiling for "other good cause." Here, the prosecution has good cause in refiling as
they seemingly innocently miscalculated the evidence in filing the original Second Degree felony
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charges that subsequently led to the State filing the charges as a Third Degree Felony. This
Court originally found that the matter would not be bound over as a second degree felony
because an ATV is not an operable motor vehicle, and when the case was bound over as a class
B misdemeanor, the court granted Defense Counsel's Motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction. Other than certain doggedness to refile this matter, ostensibly to protect the rights
of the victim, the facts do not indicate that the prosecution engaged in abusive practices in
refiling the charges. The Court determines that the prosecution has not engaged in forum
shopping, the refiling does not appear to be a tactic to withhold evidence from the defense, and,
based upon the original bindover by Judge Hilder, the charges are not groundless or improvident.
CONCLUSION
The Court denies the motion to dismiss, for while Brickey limits the State's ability to
refile charges that have been dismissed for insufficient evidence, it does not intend to preclude
refiling where a defendant's due process rights are not implicated. Absent abusive practices (e.g.
forum shopping, groundless and improvident charges, withholding evidence), no presumptive
bar to refile exits. Morgan, 2001 UT 87 ]} 16. And while a prosecutor's mistake may
inconvenience the defense, due process is not concerned with ordinary levels of inconvenience
because the "nature of the criminal justice system necessarily inconveniences those individuals
who have been accused of crimes." Id at <[ 22 (quoting People v. Noline, 917 P.2d 1256, 1264
(Colo. 1996)).
DATED this /

day of July, 2010.
BYTHECOURT: ' - ' - ^

\

MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE.
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 101901771 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL: STATE OF UTAH 111 East Broadway Suite #4 00 Salt Lake City,
UT 84111
MAIL: TERESA L WELCH MISDEMEANOR 424 E 500 S STE 300 SALT LAKE
CITY UT 84111
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